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Abstract
We examine the meaning and the complexity of probabilistic logic programs that
consist of a set of rules and a set of independent probabilistic facts (that is, programs
based on Sato’s distribution semantics). We focus on two semantics, respectively based
on stable and on well-founded models. We show that the semantics based on sta-
ble models (referred to as the “credal semantics”) produces sets of probability models
that dominate infinitely monotone Choquet capacities; we describe several useful con-
sequences of this result. We then examine the complexity of inference with probabilistic
logic programs. We distinguish between the complexity of inference when a probabilis-
tic program and a query are given (the inferential complexity), and the complexity
of inference when the probabilistic program is fixed and the query is given (the query
complexity, akin to data complexity as used in database theory). We obtain results on
the inferential and query complexity for acyclic, stratified, and cyclic propositional and
relational programs; complexity reaches various levels of the counting hierarchy and
even exponential levels.
1 Introduction
The combination of deterministic and uncertain reasoning has led to many mixtures of
logic and probability (Halpern, 2003; Hansen & Jaumard, 1996; Nilsson, 1986). In par-
ticular, combinations of logic programming constructs and probabilistic assessments have
been pursued in several guises (Fuhr, 1995; Lukasiewicz, 1998; Ng & Subrahmanian, 1992;
Poole, 1993; Sato, 1995), and the topic has generated significant literature (Raedt, Frasconi,
Kersting, & Muggleton, 2010; Raedt, 2008).
Among probabilistic logic programming languages, the approach started by Poole’s prob-
abilistic Horn abduction (Poole, 1993) and Sato’s distribution semantics (Sato, 1995) has
been very popular. Basically, there a logic program is enlarged with independent proba-
bilistic facts. For instance, consider a rule
up :− actionUp,not disturbanceUp.
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and probabilistic fact
P(disturbanceUp = true) = 0.1.
Depending on disturbanceUp, actionUp may succeed or not in leading to up.
Sato’s distribution semantics at first focused on definite programs, and was announced
“roughly, as distributions over least models” (Sato, 1995). Poole and Sato originally em-
phasized acyclic logic programs (Poole, 1993, 2008; Sato, 1995; Sato & Kameya, 2001),
even though Sato did handle cyclic ones. Since then, there has been significant work on
non-definite and on cyclic probabilistic logic programs under variants of the distribution
semantics (Hadjichristodoulou & Warren, 2012; Lukasiewicz, 2005; Riguzzi, 2015; Sato,
Kameya, & Zhou, 2005).
In this paper we examine the meaning and the computational complexity of probabilistic
logic programs that extend Sato’s distribution semantics. We look at standard function-
free normal programs containing negation as failure and probabilistic facts. The goal is to
compute an inference; that is, to compute the probability P(Q|E), where both Q and E
are sets of facts. The pair (Q,E) is referred to as the query. We distinguish between the
complexity of inference when a probabilistic program and a query are given (the inferential
complexity), and the complexity of inference when the probabilistic program is fixed and
the query is given (the query complexity). Query complexity is similar to data complexity
as used in database theory, as we discuss later.
We first examine acyclic programs; for those programs all existing semantics coin-
cide. Given the well-known relationship between acyclic probabilistic logic programs and
Bayesian networks, it is not surprising that inference for propositional acyclic programs
is PP-complete. However, it is surprising that, as we show, inference with bounded arity
acyclic programs without negation is PPNP-equivalent, thus going up the counting hierar-
chy. And we show that acyclic programs without a bound on predicate arity take us to
PEXP-completeness.
Many useful logic programs are cyclic; indeed, the use of recursion is at the heart of
logic programs and its various semantics (Gelfond & Lifschitz, 1988; van Gelder, Ross, &
Schlipf, 1991). Many applications, such as non-recursive structural equation models (Berry,
1984; Pearl, 2009) and models with “feedback” (Nodelman, Shelton, & Koller, 2002; Poole
& Crowley, 2013), defy the acyclic character of Bayesian networks.
We study cyclic normal logic programs in a few steps. First we look at the inferential
and query complexity of locally stratified programs. For these programs, again we see that
most existing semantics coincide; in particular semantics based on stable and well-founded
models are identical. To summarize, we show that the complexity of stratified programs is
the same as the complexity of acyclic programs.
We then move to general, possibly cyclic, programs. There are various semantics for
such programs, and relatively little discussion about them in the literature. For instance,
take a program consisting of two rules,
sleep :− not work,not insomnia. work :− not sleep. (1)
and a fact associated with a probabilistic assessment:
P(insomnia = true) = 0.3.
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With probability 0.3, we have that insomnia is true, and then sleep is false and work is true.
This is simple enough. But with probability 0.7, we have that insomnia is false, and then
the remaining two rules create a cycle: sleep depends on work and vice-versa. The question
is how to define a semantics when a cycle appears.
We focus on two semantics for such programs, even though we mention a few others.
First, we look at a semantics for probabilistic logic programs that can be extracted from the
work of Lukasiewicz on probabilistic description logics (Lukasiewicz, 2005, 2007). His pro-
posal is that a probabilistic logic program defines a set of probability measures, induced by
the various stable models of the underlying normal logic program. The second semantics we
examine is based on the well-founded semantics of normal logic programs: in this case there
is always a single distribution induced by a probabilistic logic program (Hadjichristodoulou
& Warren, 2012).
We first study Lukasiewicz’s semantics, referred to as the “credal semantics”. We show
that credal semantics produces sets of probability models that dominate infinitely monotone
Choquet capacities; the latter objects are relatively simple extensions of probability distribu-
tions and have been often used in the literature, from random set theory to Dempster-Shafer
theory. We then derive results concerning inferential and query complexity. We show that
the complexity of general probabilistic logic programs goes up the counting hierarchy, up to
PPNP
NP
levels; overall the complexity of the well-founded semantics is in lower classes than
the complexity of the stable model semantics.
The paper begins in Section 2 with a review of logic programming and complexity
theory. Section 3 presents basic notions concerning probabilistic logic programs and their
semantics. In Section 4 we contribute with a comparison between the credal and the well-
founded semantics. Our main results appear in Sections 5, 6, 7 and 8. In Section 5 we show
that the credal semantics of a probabilistic logic program is a set of probability measures
induced by a 2-monotone Choquet capacities. Sections 6, 7 and 8 analyze the complexity of
inferences under the credal and the well-founded semantics. The paper concludes, in Section
9, with a summary of our contributions and a discussion of future work.
2 Background
We briefly collect here some well known terminology and notation regarding logic program-
ming and complexity theory. Before we plunge into those topics, we briefly fix notation on
Bayesian networks as we will need them later. A Bayesian network is a pair consisting of a
directed acyclic graph G whose nodes are random variables, and a joint probability distri-
bution P over all variables in the graph, such that G and P satisfy the “Markov condition”
(that is, a random variable is independent of its parents given its nondescendants) (Koller
& Friedman, 2009; Neapolitan, 2003; Pearl, 1988). If all random variables are discrete,
then one can specify “local” conditional probabilities P(Xi = xi|pa(Xi) = πi), and the joint
probability distribution is necessarily the product of these local probabilities:
P(X1 = x1, . . . ,Xn = xn) =
n∏
i=1
P(Xi = xi|pa(Xi) = πi) , (2)
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where πi is the projection of {x1, . . . , xn} on the set of random variables pa(Xi); whenever
Xi has no parents, P(Xi = xi|pa(Xi) = πi) stands for P(Xi = xi).
2.1 Normal logic programs: syntax and semantics
Take a vocabulary consisting of set of logical variable symbols X,Y, . . ., a set of predicate
symbols r, s, . . ., and a set of constants a, b, . . .. A term is a constant or a logical variable;
an atom is written as r(t1, . . . , tn), where r is a predicate of arity n and each ti is a term.
A zero-arity atom is written simply as r. An atom is ground if it does not contain logical
variables.
A normal logic program consists of rules written as (Dantsin, Eiter, & Voronkov, 2001)
A0 :− A1, . . . , Am,notAm+1, . . . ,notAn.
where the Ai are atoms and not is interpreted according to some selected semantics, as
discussed later. The head of this rule is A0; the remainder of the rule is its body. A rule
without a body, written simply as A0., is a fact. A subgoal in the body is either an atom A
(a positive subgoal) or not A (a negative subgoal). A program without negation is definite,
and a program without variables is propositional.
Example 1. Here is a program describing the relation between smoking, stress, and social
influence (Fierens, Van den Broeck, Renkens, Shrerionov, Gutmann, Janssens, & de Raedt,
2014):
smokes(X) :− stress(X).
smokes(X) :− influences(Y,X), smokes(Y ).
influences(a, b). influences(b, a). stress(b).
This program is definite, but not propositional. 
The Herbrand base of a program is the set of all ground atoms built from constants and
predicates in the program. We do not consider functions in this paper, to stay with finite
Herbrand bases.
A substitution is a (partial) function that maps logical variables into terms. A grounding
is a substitution mapping into constants. The grounding of a rule is a ground rule obtained
by applying the same grounding to each atom. The grounding of a program is the propo-
sitional program obtained by applying every possible grounding all rules, using only the
constants in the program (i.e., using only ground atoms in the Herbrand base). An atom A
unifies with an atom B if there is a substitution that makes both (syntactically) equal.
A literal L is either an atom A or a negated atom ¬A. A set of literals is inconsistent
if A and ¬A belong to it. Given a normal logic program P, a partial interpretation is a
consistent set of literals whose atoms belong to the Herbrand base of P. An interpretation
is a consistent set of literals such that every atom in the Herbrand base appears in a literal.
An atom is true (resp., false) in a (partial) interpretation if it appears in a non-negated
(resp., negated) literal. A subgoal is true in an interpretation if it is an atom A and A
belongs to the interpretation, or the subgoal is not A and ¬A belongs to the interpretation.
A grounded rule is satisfied in a partial interpretation if its head is true in the interpretation,
or any of its subgoals is false in the interpretation. A model of P is an interpretation such
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influences(b, a) influences(a, b)stress(a) stress(b)
smokes(a) smokes(b)
influences(a, a) influences(b, b)
Figure 1: Grounded dependency graph for Example 1.
that every grounding of a rule in P is satisfied. A minimal model of P is a model with
minimum number of non-negated literals.
The dependency graph of a program is a directed graph where each predicate is a node,
and where there is an edge from a node B to a node A if there is a rule where A appears
in the head and B appears in the body; if B appears right after not, the edge is negative;
otherwise, it is positive. The grounded dependency graph is the dependency graph of the
propositional program obtained by grounding. For instance, the grounded dependency graph
of the program in Example 1 is depicted in Figure 1.
A program is acyclic when its grounded dependency graph is acyclic.
Concerning the semantics of normal logic programs, there are, broadly speaking, two
strategies to follow. One strategy is to translate programs into a first-order theory that
is called a completion of the program. Then the semantics of the program is the set of
first-order models of its completion. The most famous completion is Clark’s (Clark, 1978),
roughly defined as follows. First, rewrite each body by replacing commas by ∧ and not by
¬. Second, remove constants from heads: to do so, consider a rule A0(a) :− Bi., where a is
a constant and Bi is the body; then this rule is replaced by A0(X) :− (X = a)∧Bi.. Then,
for each set of rules that share the same head A0, write A0 ⇔ B1 ∨ B2 ∨ . . . ∨ Bk, where
each Bi is the body of one of the rules.
The second strategy that is often used to define the semantics of normal logic programs
is to select some models of the program to be its semantics. There are many proposals
in the literature as to which models should be selected; however, currently there are two
selections that have received most attention: the stable model (Gelfond & Lifschitz, 1988)
and the well-founded (van Gelder et al., 1991) semantics. We now describe these semantics;
alas, their definitions are not simple.
Consider first the stable model semantics. Suppose we have a normal logic program P
and an interpretation I . Define the reduct PI to be a definite program that contains rule
A0 :− A1, . . . , Am. iff one of the grounded rules fromP isA0 :− A1, . . . , Am,not Am+1, . . . ,not An.
where each Am+1, . . . , An is false in I . That is, the reduct is obtained by (i) grounding P,
(ii) removing all rules that contain a subgoal not A in their body such that A is an atom
that is true in I , (iii) removing all remaining literals of the form not A from the remaining
rules. An interpretation I is a stable model if I is a minimal model of PI . Note that a
normal program may fail to have a stable model, or may have several stable models.
There are two types of logical reasoning under the stable mode semantics (Eiter, Faber,
Fink, & Woltran, 2007). Brave reasoning asks whether there is a stable model containing
a specific atom (and possibly returns it if it exists). Cautious reasoning asks whether a
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specific atom appears in all stable models (and possibly lists all such models).
Consider now the well-founded semantics. Given a subset U of the Herbrand base of a
program, and a partial interpretation I , say that an atom A is unfounded with respect to
U and I iff for each grounded rule whose head is A, we have that (i) some subgoal Ai or
not Ai is false in I , or (ii) some subgoal that is an atom Ai is in U . Now say that a subset U
of the Herbrand base is an unfounded set with respect to interpretation I if each atom in U
is unfounded with respect to U and I . This is a complex definition: roughly, it means that,
for each possible rule that we might apply to obtain A, either the rule cannot be used (given
I), or there is an atom in U that must be first shown to be true. Now, given normal logic
program P, define TP(I) to be a transformation that takes interpretation I and returns
another interpretation: A ∈ TP(I) iff there is some grounded rule with head A such that
every subgoal in the body is true in I . Also define UP(I) to be the greatest unfounded set
with respect to I (there is always such a greatest set). Define WP(I) = TP(I) ∪ ¬UP(I),
where the notation ¬UP(I) means that we take each literal in UP(I) and negate it (that is,
A becomes ¬A; ¬A becomes A). Intuitively, TP is what we can “easily prove to be positive”
and UP is what we can “easily prove to be negative”.
Finally: the well-founded semantics of P is the least fixed point of WP(I); this fixed
point always exists. That is, apply Ii+1 = WP(Ii), starting from I0 = ∅, until it stabilizes;
the resulting interpretation is the well-founded model. The iteration stops in finitely many
steps given that we have finite Herbrand bases.
The well-founded semantics determines the truth assignment for a subset of the atoms
in the Herbrand base; for the remaining atoms, their “truth values are not determined by
the program” (van Gelder et al., 1991, Section 1.3). A very common interpretation of this
situation is that the well-founded semantics uses three-valued logic with values true, false,
and undefined. It so happens that any well-founded model is a subset of every stable model
of a normal logic program (van Gelder et al., 1991, Corollary 5.7); hence, if a program has
a well-founded model that is an interpretation for all atoms, then this well-founded model
is the unique stable model (the converse is not true).
There are other ways to define the well-founded semantics that are explicitly constructive
(Baral & Subrahmanian, 1993; Gelder, 1993; Przymusinski, 1989). One is this, where the
connection with the stable model semantics is emphasized (Baral & Subrahmanian, 1993):
write LFTP(I) to mean the least fixpoint of TPI ; then the well-founded semantics of P
consists of those atoms A that are in the least fixpoint of LFTP(LFTP(·)) plus the literals
¬A for those atoms A that are not in the greatest fixpoint of LFTP(LFTP(·)). Note that
LFTP(LFTP(·)) is a monotone operator.
It is instructive to look at some examples.
Example 2. First, take a program P with two rules: p :− not q,not r. and q :− not p.
(identical to rules in Expression (1)). This program has two stable models: both assign
false to r; one assigns true to p and false to q, while the other assigns true to q and false to
p (note P{p,¬q,¬r} = {p.} and P{¬p,q,¬r} = {q.}). The well-founded semantics assigns false
to r and leaves p and q as undefined. 
Example 3. Consider a game where a player wins if there is another player with no more
moves (van Gelder et al., 1991; Gelder, 1993), as expressed by the cyclic rule:
wins(X) :− move(X,Y ),not wins(Y ).
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Suppose the available moves are given as the following facts:
move(a, b). move(b, a). move(b, c). move(c, d).
There are two stable models: both assign true to wins(c) and false to wins(d); one assigns
true to wins(a) and false to wins(b), while the other assigns true to wins(b) and false to
wins(a). The well-founded semantics leads to partial interpretation {wins(c),¬wins(d)},
leaving wins(a) and wins(b) as undefined. If move(a, b) is not given as a fact, it is assigned
false, and the well-founded semantics leads to {¬wins(a),wins(b),wins(c),¬wins(d)}. 
Example 4. The Barber Paradox: If the barber shaves all, and only, those villagers who
do not shave themselves, does the barber shave himself? Consider:
shaves(X,Y ) :− barber(X), villager(Y ),not shaves(Y, Y ).
villager(a). barber(b). villager(b).
(3)
There is no stable model for this normal logic program: the facts and the rule lead to the
pattern shaves(b, b) :− not shaves(b, b)., thus eliminating any possible stable model. The
well-founded semantics assigns false to barber(a), to shaves(a, a) and to shaves(a, b). Also,
shaves(b, a) is assigned true, and shaves(b, b) is left undefined. That is, even though the
semantics leaves the status of the barber as undefined, it does produce meaningful answers
for other villagers. 
2.2 Complexity theory: the counting hierarchy
We adopt basic terminology and notation from computational complexity (Papadimitriou,
1994). A language is a set of strings. A language defines a decision problem; that is, the
problem of deciding whether an input string is in the language. A complexity class is a
set of languages; we use well-known complexity classes such as P, NP, EXP, NEXP. The
complexity class PP consists of those languages L that satisfy the following property: there
is a polynomial time nondeterministic Turing machine M such that ℓ ∈ L iff more than
half of the computations of M on input ℓ end up accepting. Analogously, we have PEXP,
consisting of those languages L with the following property: there is an exponential time
nondeterministic Turing machine M such that ℓ ∈ L iff half of the computations of M on
input ℓ end up accepting (Buhrman, Fortnow, & Thierauf, 1998).
An oracle Turing machine ML, where L is a language, is a Turing machine that can
write a string ℓ to an “oracle” tape and obtain from the oracle, in unit time, the decision
as to whether ℓ ∈ L or not. Similarly, for a function f , an oracle Turing machine Mf can
be defined. If a class of languages/functions A is defined by a set of Turing machines M
(that is, the languages/functions are decided/computed by these machines), then AL is the
set of languages/functions that are decided/computed by {ML : M ∈ M}. Similarly, for
any class A we have Af . If A and B are classes of languages/functions, AB = ∪x∈BAx. The
polynomial hierarchy consists of classes ΠPi = coΣ
P
i and Σ
P
i = NP
ΣPi−1 , with ΣP0 = P. Later
we also use classes ∆Pi = P
ΣPi−1 and PH = ∪iΠPi = ∪iΣ
P
i .
Wagner’s polynomial counting hierarchy is the smallest set of classes containing P and,
recursively, for any class C in the polynomial counting hierarchy, the classes PPC, NPC, and
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coNPC (Wagner, 1986, Theorem 4) (Tóran, 1991, Theorem 4.1). The polynomial hierarchy
is included in Wagner’s counting polynomial hierarchy.
A many-one reduction from L to L′ is a polynomial time algorithm that takes the input
to decision problem L and transforms it into the input to decision problem L′ such that
L′ has the same output as L. For a complexity class C, a decision problem L is C-hard
with respect to many-one reductions if each decision problem in C can be reduced to L with
many-one reductions. A decision problem is then C-complete with respect to many-one
reductions if it is in C and it is C-hard with respect to many-one reductions.
In proofs we will often use propositional formulas; such a formula is in Conjunctive
Normal Form (CNF) when it is a conjunction of clauses (where a clause is a disjunction
of literals). A kCNF is a CNF in which each clause has k literals. We use the following
PPΣ
P
k -complete problem (Wagner, 1986, Theorem 7), that we refer to as #k3CNF(>):
Input: A pair (φ,M), where φ(X0,X1, . . . ,Xk) is a propositional formula in 3CNF and
each Xi is a tuple of logical variables, and M is an integer.
Output: Whether or not the number of truth assignments for X0 in the formula
Q1X1 : Q2X2 : . . . ∃Xk : φ(X0,X1, . . . ,Xk),
is strictly larger than M , where the quantifiers alternate and each logical variable not
in X0 is bound to a quantifier.
Another PPΣ
P
k -complete problem, referred to as #kDNF(>) is:
Input: A pair (φ,M), where φ(X0,X1, . . . ,Xk) is a propositional formula in DNF and each
Xi is a tuple of logical variables, and M is an integer.
Output: Whether or not the number of truth assignments for X0 in the formula
Q1X1 : Q2X2 : . . . ∀Xk : φ(X0,X1, . . . ,Xk),
is strictly larger than M , where the quantifiers alternate and each logical variable not
in X0 is bound to a quantifier.
A detail is that Wagner defines a PPΣ
P
k -complete problem using “≥ k” instead of “> M ”,
but the former is equivalent to “> M − 1”, so both inequalities can be used.
3 Probabilistic normal logic programs
In this paper we focus on a particularly simple combination of logic programming and
probabilities (Poole, 1993; Sato, 1995). A probabilistic logic program, abbreviated plp, is a
pair 〈P,PF〉 consisting of a normal logic program P and a set of probabilistic facts PF. A
probabilistic fact is a pair consisting of an atom A and a probability value α; we use the
notation α :: A. borrowed from the ProbLog package1 (Fierens et al., 2014).
We assume that every probability value is a rational number.
1At https://dtai.cs.kuleuven.be/problog/index.html.
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Example 5. Here is a syntactically correct ProbLog program:
0.7 :: burglary. 0.2 :: earthquake.
alarm :− burglary, earthquake, a1.
alarm :− burglary,not earthquake, a2.
alarm :− not burglary, earthquake, a3.
0.9 :: a1. 0.8 :: a2. 0.1 :: a3.
calls(X) :− alarm, neighbor(X).
neighbor(a). neighbor(b).
There are four rules, two facts, and five probabilistic facts. 
A probabilistic fact may contain logical variables; for instance, we may write α ::
r(X1, . . . ,Xn).. We interpret such a parameterized probabilistic fact as the set of all
grounded probabilistic facts obtained by substituting variables with constants in the Her-
brand base.2
Given a plp 〈P,PF〉 where P is acyclic, we say the plp is acyclic. Likewise, if P is
definite, stratified, cyclic, etc, we use the same adjective for the whole plp.
3.1 The semantics of probabilistic facts
The interpretation of probabilistic facts requires some pause. Suppose we have a plp
〈P,PF〉 with n probabilistic facts (which may be groundings of probabilistic facts con-
taining logical variables). From 〈P,PF〉 we can generate 2n normal logic programs: for
each probabilistic fact α :: A., we can either choose to keep fact A., or choose to erase
fact A. altogether. These choices are assumed independent: this is Sato’s independence
assumption.
For instance, consider the plp:
0.5 :: r. 0.5 :: s. v :− r, s. (4)
We have four ways to write a normal logic program out of this plp; that is, r can be kept
or removed, and likewise for s. All these normal logic programs are obtained with the same
probability 0.25, and in one of them v is true; consequently, the probability P(v = true) =
0.25.
A total choice θ for the plp is a subset of the set of grounded probabilistic facts. We
interpret θ as a set of ground facts that are probabilistic selected to be included in P; all
other ground facts obtained from probabilistic facts are to be discarded. The probability
of a total choice is easily computed: it is a product over the grounded probabilistic facts,
where probabilistic fact α :: A. contributes with factor α if A. is kept, or factor (1−α) if A.
is removed. Now for each total choice θ we obtain a normal logic program, that we denote
by P ∪PF↓θ.
For instance, the plp in Expression (4) has two probabilistic facts, leading to four total
choices, each with probability 0.25. Now consider a more complicated plp:
0.5 :: r. 0.6 :: r. 0.2 :: s(a). 0.3 :: s(X). v :− r, s(a), s(b).
2ProbLog additionally has “probabilistic rules” but those are simply syntactic sugar that we do not need
here.
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There are five ground probabilistic facts (after grounding s(X) appropriately); hence there
are 32 total choices. Suppose we choose to keep the fact in the first probabilistic fact, and
discard all the others (with probability 0.5× 0.4 × 0.8 × 0.7× 0.7); then we obtain
r. v :− r, s(a), s(b).,
a program with a single stable model where r is the only true atom. By going through
all possible total choices, we have that P(r = true) = 0.8 (as r. is kept in the program
by a first choice with probability 0.5 or by a second choice with probability 0.6, hence
0.5 + 0.6 − 0.5 × 0.6 = 0.8). Similarly, P(s(a) = true) = 0.2 + 0.3 − 0.2 × 0.3 = 0.44; note
however that P(s(b) = true) = 0.3. And finally, P(v = true) = 0.8× 0.44 × 0.3 = 0.1056.
Sato assumes that no probabilistic fact unifies with the head of a non-fact rule (that is,
a rule with a nonempty body); this is called the disjointness condition (Sato, 1995). From
a modeling perspective this is a convenient assumption even though we do not need it in
our complexity results. In fact from a modeling perspective an even stronger disjointness
condition makes sense: no probabilistic fact should unify with the head of any rule (with a
body or not), nor with any other probabilistic fact. Under this assumption, the probabilistic
fact α :: A. can be directly interpreted as a probabilistic assessment P(A = true) = α. Again,
we do not need such an assumption for our results, but our examples will always satisfy it,
and it makes sense to assume that it will always be adopted in practice.
3.2 The semantics of definite/acyclic/stratified probabilistic logic pro-
grams
We can now discuss the semantics of a plp 〈P,PF〉. First, take the grounding of this plp.
Now for each total choice θ we obtain the normal logic program P ∪ PF↓θ. Hence the
distribution over total choices induces a distribution over normal logic programs.
A common assumption is that, for each total choice θ, the resulting normal logic program
P ∪ PF↓θ yields a single model (Fierens et al., 2014). For instance, if P is definite, then
P ∪ PF↓θ is definite for any θ, and P ∪ PF↓θ has a unique stable model that is also its
unique well-founded model. Thus the unique distribution over total choices becomes a
unique distribution over stable/well-founded models. This distribution is exactly Sato’s
distribution semantics (Sato, 1995). Similarly, suppose that P is acyclic; then P ∪ PF↓θ is
acyclic for any θ, and P∪PF↓θ has a unique stable model that is also its unique well-founded
model (Apt & Bezem, 1991).
Poole’s and Sato’s original work focused respectively on acyclic and definite programs;
in both cases the semantics of resulting normal logic programs is uncontroversial. The same
can be said of the larger class of stratified programs; a normal logic program is stratified when
cycles in the grounded dependency graph contain no negative edge (this is often referred
to as locally stratified in the literature) (Apt, Blair, & Walker, 1988). Both the stable
and the well-founded semantics are identical for stratified programs, and both generate
a unique interpretation for all atoms. As a consequence, a plp 〈P,PF〉 has a unique
distribution semantics whenever P is stratified. Note that both acyclic and definite programs
are stratified.
Example 6. The plp in Example 5 is acyclic, and thus stratified, but not definite. The
grounded dependency graph of this program is depicted in Figure 2. This graph can be
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neighbor(b)a1 a2 a3
Figure 2: The grounded dependency graph for Example 5.
interpreted as a Bayesian network, as we discuss later (Poole, 1993). There are 25 total
choices, and the probability of calls(a) is 0.58.
Example 7. Consider a probabilistic version of the “smokers” program in Example 1
(Fierens et al., 2014):
smokes(X) :− stress(X).
smokes(X) :− influences(Y,X), smokes(Y ).
0.3 :: influences(a, b). 0.3 :: influences(b, a). 0.8 :: stress(b).
The grounded dependency graph of this program is identical to the one shown in Figure
1. It is tempting to interpret this graph as a Bayesian network, but of course this is not
quite right as the graph is cyclic. Indeed the program is not acyclic, but it is definite and
therefore stratified, hence a unique distribution is defined over ground atoms. For instance,
we have P(smokes(a)) = 0.06 and P(smokes(b)) = 0.2. The program would still be stratified
if the first rule were replaced by
smokes(X) :− not stress(X).
In this case there would still be a cycle, but the negative edge in the dependency graph
would not belong to the cycle. 
Often a stratified program is used to implement recursion, as illustrated by the next
example:
Example 8. Consider the following plp, based on an example in the ProbLog distribution:
path(X,Y ) :− edge(X,Y ).
path(X,Y ) :− edge(X,Y ), path(X,Y ).
0.6 :: edge(1, 2). 0.1 :: edge(1, 3). 0.4 :: edge(2, 5). 0.3 :: edge(2, 6).
0.3 :: edge(3, 4). 0.8 :: edge(4, 5). 0.2 :: edge(5, 6).
That is, we have a random graph with nodes 1, . . . , 6, and probabilities attached to edges.
The query P(path(1, 6) = true) yields the probability that there is a path between nodes 1
and 6. Using ProbLog one obtains P(path(1, 6) = true) = 0.217. 
3.3 The semantics of general probabilistic logic programs
If a normal logic program is non-stratified, then its well-founded semantics may be a partial
interpretation, and some atoms may be left as undefined; it may have several stable models,
or no stable model at all. Thus we must accommodate these cases when we contemplate
non-stratified plps.
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3.3.1 The credal semantics
A first possible semantics for general probabilistic logic programs can be extracted from
work by Lukasiewicz (2005, 2007) on probabilistic description logic programs. To describe
that proposal, a few definitions are needed. A plp 〈P,PF〉 is consistent if there is at least
one stable model for each total choice of PF. A probability model for a consistent plp
〈P,PF〉 is a probability measure P over interpretations of P, such that:
(i) every interpretation I with P(I) > 0 is a stable model of P ∪PF↓θ for the total choice
θ that agrees with I on the probabilistic facts (that is, θ induces the same truth values as
I for the grounded probabilistic facts); and
(ii) the probability of each total choice θ is the product of the probabilities for all individual
choices in θ.
The set of all probability models for a plp is the semantics of the program. Later examples
will clarify this construction.
Lukasiewicz calls his proposed semantics the answer set semantics for probabilistic de-
scription logic programs; however, note that this name is both too restrictive (the semantics
can be used for programs with functions, for instance) and a bit opaque (it does not em-
phasize the fact that it deals with uncertainty). We prefer the term credal semantics, which
we adopt from now on. The reason for this latter name is that a set of probability measures
is often called a credal set (Augustin, Coolen, de Cooman, & Troffaes, 2014).
Now given a consistent plp, we may be interested in the smallest possible value of
P(Q) for a set Q of truth assignments, with respect to the set K of all probability models
of the plp. This is conveyed by the lower probability of Q, P(Q) = infP∈K P(Q). Sim-
ilarly, we have the upper probability of Q, P(Q) = supP∈K P(Q). Suppose that we also
have a set of E of truth assignments for ground atoms; then we may be interested in the
conditional lower and upper probabilities, respectively P(Q|E) = infP∈K:P(E)>0 P(Q|E) and
P(Q|E) = supP∈K:P(E)>0 P(Q|E). We leave conditional lower/upper probabilities undefined
when P(E) = 0 (that is, when P(E) = 0 for every probability model). This is not the only
possible convention: Lukasiewicz (2005, Section 3) adopts P(Q|E) = 1 and P(Q|E) = 0
in this case, while Walley’s style of conditioning prescribes P(Q|E) = 0 and P(Q|E) = 1
whenever P(E) = 0 (Walley, 1991).
3.3.2 The well-founded semantics
The approach by Hadjichristodoulou and Warren (2012) is to allow probabilities directly
over well-founded models, thus allowing probabilities over atoms that are undefined. That
is, given a plp 〈P,PF〉, associate to each total choice θ the unique well-founded model of
P∪PF↓θ to θ; the unique distribution over total choices induces a unique distribution over
well-founded models. Note that probabilities may be assigned to undefined values in this
sort of semantics. As we discuss in Section 4, this is a bold proposal whose interpretation
is far from simple.
Regardless of its meaning, the approach deserves attention as it is the only one in the
literature that genuinely combines well-founded semantics with probabilities. Accordingly,
we refer to it as the well-founded semantics of probabilistic logic programs (the combination
of language and semantics is named WF-PRISM by Hadjichristodoulou and Warren).
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3.3.3 Other semantics
Sato et al. propose a semantics where distributions are defined over models produced by Fit-
ting’s three-valued semantics (Sato et al., 2005). We note that Fitting’s semantics is weaker
than the well-founded semantics, and the literature on logic programming has consistently
preferred the latter, as we do in this paper.
Another three-valued approach, proposed by Lukasiewicz (2005, 2007), leaves the prob-
ability of any formula as undefined whenever the formula is undefined for any total choice
(to determine whether a formula is undefined or not in a particular partial interpretation,
three-valued logic is used). Hence, when a formula gets a (non-undefined) numeric proba-
bility value, its truth value is the same for all stable models; thus any numeric probability
calculations that are produced with this semantics agree with the semantics based on stable
models Lukasiewicz (2007, Theorem 4.5). That is, Lukasiewicz’ proposal is more akin to
the credal semantics than to the well-founded semantics.
A different semantics for non-stratified plps is adopted by the P-log language (Baral,
Gelfond, & Rushton, 2009). P-log allows for disjunction in heads and other features, but
when restricted to normal logic programs it is syntactically similar to ProbLog. The se-
mantics of a P-log program is given by a single probability distribution over possibly many
stable models; whenever necessary default assumptions are called to distribute probability
evenly, or to avoid inconsistent realizations (by re-normalization). We leave an analysis of
this sort of semantics to the future; here we prefer to focus on semantics that do not make
default assumptions concerning probabilities.
It is also important to mention the constraint logic programming language of Michels,
Hommersom, Lucas, and Velikova (2015), a significant contribution that is also based on
credal sets. However, they use a syntax and semantics that is markedly different from
Lukasiewicz’s approach, as they allow continuous variables but do not let a program have
multiple stable models per total choice. They also present expressions for (conditional) lower
and upper probabilities, by direct optimization; in Section 5 we show that such expressions
can be derived from properties of infinitely monotone Choquet capacities.
Finally, Ceylan, Lukasiewicz, and Peñaloza (2016) have introduced a semantics that
allows for inconsistent plps to have meaning without getting into three-valued logic. They
adopt a much more sophisticated family of logic programs (within the Datalog± language),
and they provide a thorough analysis of complexity that we discuss later. This is also a
proposal that deserves future study.
In this paper we focus on the credal and the well-founded semantics in the remainder of
this paper, whenever non-stratified plps are discussed, but certainly there are other avenues
to explore.
4 The semantics of the credal and the well-founded semantics
It does not seem that any comparison is available in the literature between the credal
and the well-founded semantics for non-stratified plps. Indeed, the credal semantics has
not been adopted since its appearance, a turn of events we find unfortunate as it is quite a
sensible semantics for general plps. In this section we present some examples that emphasize
differences between these semantics, and we examine their interpretation.
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Example 9. Consider a probabilistic version of Example 2:
p :− not q,not r. q :− not p. α :: r.
This is in essence identical to the plp in Expression (1). To interpret the plp, note that
with probability α we obtain the normal logic program
p :− not q,not r. q :− not p. r.
The unique stable/well-founded model of this program assigns true to r and q, and false to
p. That is, we have the stable model s1 = {¬p, q, r}. On the other hand, with probability
1− α we obtain a program with different behavior, namely:
p :− not q,not r. q :− not p.
This program has two stable models: s2 = {p,¬q,¬r} and s3 = {¬p, q,¬r}. But this
program has a single well-founded model, where r is false and both p and q are undefined.
Consider the credal semantics. There is a probabilty model such that P(s2) = 1−α and
P(s3) = 0, and another probability model such that P(s2) = 0 and P(s3) = 1 − α. Indeed
any probability measure such that P(s1) = α and P(s2) = γ(1−α), P(s3) = (1− γ)(1−α),
for γ ∈ [0, 1], is also a probability model for this plp.
The well-founded semantics is instead a single distribution that assigns P(s1) = 1 − α,
and assigns probability mass α to the partial interpretation {¬r}.
Now consider an inference; say for instance one wants P(r = true). Clearly P(r = true) =
1 − α, regardless of the semantics. But consider p. With respect to the credal semantics,
the relevant quantities are P(p = true) = 0 and P(p = true) = 1 − α. And with respect to
the well-founded semantics we have instead P(p = true) = 0 and P(p = false) = α, while
P(p = undefined) = 1− α.
To elaborate on this sort of programming pattern, consider the following non-propositional
example, adapted from Eiter, Ianni, and Krennwalner (2009):
0.9 :: man(dilbert).
single(X) :− man(X),not husband(X).
husband(X) :− man(X),not single(X).
When man(dilbert) is discarded, the resulting normal logic program has a single stable model
s1 = {¬man(dilbert),¬husband(dilbert),¬single(dilbert)}. When man(dilbert) is a fact, the
resulting program two stable models:
s2 = {man(dilbert), husband(dilbert),¬single(dilbert)},
s3 = {man(dilbert),¬husband(dilbert), single(dilbert)};
the well-founded semantics instead leads to undefined values both for husband(dilbert) and
single(dilbert).
Note that any probability measure such that P(s1) = 0.1, P(s2) = 0.9γ, and P(s3) =
0.9(1−γ), for γ ∈ [0, 1], is a probability model. Hence we have P(husband(dilbert) = true) =
0 and P(husband(dilbert) = true) = 0.9 with respect to the credal semantics, while we
have P(husband(dilbert) = true) = 0, P(husband(dilbert) = false) = 0.1, and finally we have
P(husband(dilbert) = undefined) = 0.9 with respect to the well-founded semantics. 
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a b cold headache Probability
true true false false 0.34 × 0.25 = 0.085
true false true true 0.34 × 0.75 = 0.255
false true undefined undefined 0.66 × 0.25 = 0.165
false false false true 0.66 × 0.75 = 0.495
Table 1: Total choices, the induced assignments, and their probabilities, for Example 10.
Example 10. Now take a plp adapted from an example by Hadjichristodoulou and Warren
(2012, Example IV.1), where the same pattern of cyclic negation observed in the previous
example seems to appear:
cold :− headache, a. cold :− not headache,not a. 0.34 :: a.
headache :− cold, b. headache :− not b. 0.25 :: b.
There are four total choices, each inducing a normal logic program. In one case, namely
{¬a, b}, the resulting normal logic program has no stable model. Hence, this plp has
no credal semantics. However, it does have a well-founded semantics. Table 1 shows the
assignments for cold and headache induced by the various total choices; we obtain
P(cold = true) = 0.255, P(headache = true) = 0.750,
P(cold = undefined) = 0.165, P(headache = undefined) = 0.165,
P(cold = false) = 0.580, P(headache = false) = 0.085.
by collecting probabilities from Table 1. 
Example 11. Consider a graph coloring problem consisting of the rules:
color(V, red) :− not color(V, yellow),not color(V, green), vertex(V ).
color(V, yellow) :− not color(V, red),not color(V, green), vertex(V ).
color(V, green) :− not color(V, red),not color(V, yellow), vertex(V ).
clash :− not clash, edge(V,U), color(V,C), color(U,C).
and the facts: for i ∈ {1, . . . , 5}, vertex(i)., and
color(2, red). color(5, green).
0.5 :: edge(4, 5).
edge(1, 3). edge(1, 4). edge(2, 1). edge(2, 4). edge(3, 5). edge(4, 3).
The facts mentioning vertex and edge encode the graph in Figure 3 (left); the probabilistic
fact is indicated as a dashed edge. A total choice determines a particular graph. For a fixed
total choice, the stable models of the program are the 3-colorings of the resulting graph
(this is indeed a popular example of answer set programming (Eiter et al., 2009)).
Now, if probabilistic fact edge(4, 5) is true, there is a single stable model; otherwise, there
are two stable models. Using the credal semantics we obtain: P(color(1, yellow) = true) = 0
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Figure 3: Graph described in Example 11 (left), and the stable models produced by fixing
colors to nodes 2 and 5: one stable model is obtained for a total choice (right, top), and two
stable models are obtained for the other total choice (right, bottom). [Note that “yellow”
appears as very light grey, “green” appears as light grey, and “red” appears as dark grey
when printed in black-and-white.]
and P(color(1, yellow) = true) = 1/2; also, we have P(color(4, yellow) = true) = 1/2 and
P(color(4, yellow) = true) = 1; and P(color(3, red) = true) = P(color(3, red) = true) = 1.
On the other hand, the well-founded semantics leaves undefined the colors of vertices 1,
3, and 4, both when edge(4, 5) is true and when it is false. Thus we have, for V ∈ {1, 3, 4}
and C ∈ {red, yellow, green}, that P(color(V,C) = undefined) = 1. 
Example 12. Take the normal logic program discussed in Example 3, and consider the
following probabilistic version (there is one probabilistic move in the game):
wins(X) :− move(X,Y ),not wins(Y ).
move(a, b). move(b, a). move(b, c). 0.3 :: move(c, d).
If move(c, d) is discarded, there is a single stable model (where b is the only winning
position); otherwise, there are two stable models (wins(c) is true and wins(d) is false in both
of them; wins(a) is true in one, while wins(b) is true in the other). Thus the credal semantics
yields P(wins(b) = true) = 0.7 and P(wins(b) = true) = 1.0; P(wins(c) = true) = 0.3 and
P(wins(c) = true) = 0.3.
Now if move(c, d) is discarded, the well-founded model is the unique stable model where
b is the only winning position. But if move(c, d) is true, then the well-founded model assigns
true to wins(c) and false to wins(d), leaving both wins(a) and wins(b) as undefined. Hence the
well-founded semantics yields P(wins(c) = true) = 0.3 and P(wins(c) = false) = 0.7, while
P(wins(b) = true) = 0.7 and P(wins(b) = undefined) = 0.3. 
Example 13. Return to the Barber Paradox discussed in Example 4, now with a proba-
bilistic twist:
shaves(X,Y ) :− barber(X), villager(Y ),not shaves(Y, Y ).
villager(a). barber(b). 0.5 :: villager(b).
This program does not have a stable model when villager(b) is a fact. Thus the plp fails
to have a credal semantics.
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However, the well-founded semantics is clear even when villager(b) is true: in this case,
barber(a), shaves(a, a) and shaves(a, b) are false, while shaves(b, a) is true, and shaves(b, b) is
undefined. And the well-founded semantics is also clear when villager(b) is discarded (that is,
when villager(b) is false): only shaves(b, a) is true. Hence we obtain P(shaves(b, a) = true) =
1, while P(shaves(b, b) = false) = 0.5 and P(shaves(b, b) = undefined) = 0.5. 
These examples should suffice to show that there are substantial differences between the
credal and the well-founded semantics. What to choose?
We start our analysis with the well-founded semantics. At first it may seem that this
semantics is very attractive because if attaches a unique probability distribution to every
well-formed plp (even in cases where the credal semantics is not defined). Besides, the
well-founded semantics for plps is conceptually simple for anyone who has mastered the
well-founded semantics for normal logic programs.
On the other hand, some of the weaknesses of the well-founded semantics already appear
in non-probabilistic programs. Certainly the point here is not to emphasize non-probabilistic
programs, but consider the difficulty of the well-founded semantics in “reasoning by cases”.
For instance, consider the program (van Gelder et al., 1991):
a :− not b. b :− not a. p :− a. p :− b.
The well-founded semantics leaves every atom undefined. However, it is apparent that p
should be assigned true, for we can find two ways to understand the relation between a and
b, and both ways take p to true (these two interpretations are exactly the stable models:
one contains a and ¬b, the other contains ¬a and b). The reader should note that this is
similar to the situation in Example 11: there the well-founded semantics cannot even fix
the color of vertex 3, even though this vertex must clearly be colored red.
The well-founded semantics of non-probabilistic normal logic programs has also drawn
criticism in its reliance on three-valued logic, and the status of the undefined truth value has
received attention not only in philosophical inquiry (Bergmann, 2008; Malinowski, 2007),
but in the practical development of databases (Date, 2005; Rubinson, 2007). In short, it
is difficult to determine whether undefined should be taken as simply an expression of sub-
jective ignorance, or the indication that something really is neither true nor false (Wallace,
1993, Section 1.2.1.2).
In any case, we do not want to repeat the old and unresolved debate on three-valued
logic here; we want to focus on the even bigger problems that appear when three-valued
logic is mixed with probabilities. The problem is that undefined values reflect a type of
uncertainty, and probability is supposed to deal with uncertainty; by putting those together
we may wish to invite collaboration but we may end up with plain confusion. Consider for
instance Example 10. What does it mean to say that P(headache = undefined) = 0.165?
Supposedly probability is here to tell us the odds of true and false; by learning the prob-
ability of undefined, the next question should be about the probability of headache to
be true when one is saying that it is undefined. In fact, one might ask for the value of
P(headache = true|headache = undefined), not realizing that in the well-founded semantics
this value is simply zero. To emphasize the difficulty in interpretation, suppose we add to
Example 10 the simple rule
c :− a, b.
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and one asks for P(c = false|cold = undefined). Should this number really be 1, as ob-
tained through the well-founded semantics, or should we expect this to be a question about
P(c = false), given that nothing of substance is observed about cold?
The probabilistic Barber Paradox discussed in Example 13 describes a situation where
the well-founded semantics can answer questions for some individuals, even as it fails to
find definite answers for other questions. This is rather attractive, but one must ask: What
exactly is the meaning of P(shaves(b, b) = undefined) = 0.5? Note that, for the logical
program described in Example 4, it makes sense to return an undefined value: we are at a
logical corner. However, for the probabilistic program it is less sensible to obtain a non-zero
probability that some particular fact is undefined.
A difficulty here is that undefined values appear due to a variety of situations that should
apparently be treated in distinct ways: (i) programs may be contradictory (as it happens in
Example 10); (ii) programs may fail to have a clear meaning (as in the Barber Paradox); or
(iii) programs may simply have several possible meanings (for instance, various stable models
as in Example 11). In case (i), it is even surprising that one would try to assign probabilities
to contradictory cases. In cases (ii) and (iii), probabilities may be contemplated, but then
there is a confusing mix of probabilities and undefined values. The interpretation of the
various possible meanings of undefined, already difficult in three-valued logic, is magnified
by the challenges in interpreting probabilities.
Now consider the credal semantics. There are two possible criticisms one may raise
against it. First, a program may fail to have a credal semantics: consider the probabilistic
Barber Paradox. Second, the credal semantics relies on sets of probability measures (credal
sets), not on unique measures. We examine these two points in turn.
The fact that some programs may fail to have a credal semantics is an annoyance in
that programs must be checked for consistency. However, as we have noted already, some
programs can seem contradictory, and in those cases one could argue that it is appropriate
not to have semantics. So, one may be perfectly satisfied with failure in Example 10, for
the total choice {¬a, b} in essence leads to the following clearly unsatisfiable pair of rules:
headache :− cold. cold :− not headache.
What seems to be needed here is a verifier that checks consistency of plps; we look into
this later in this paper.
Now consider the fact that the credal semantics relies on credal sets. Anyone expecting
any inference to produce a single probability value may be puzzled, but reliance on sets of
probabilities does not seem to be a flaw when examined in detail. One argument in favor
of sets of probabilities is that they are legitimate representations for incomplete, imprecise
or indeterminate beliefs, that can be justified in a variety of ways (Augustin et al., 2014;
Troffaes & De Cooman, 2014; Walley, 1991). But even if one is not willing to take credal
sets as a final representation of beliefs, the credal semantics is wholly reasonable from a
least commitment perspective. That is, the main question should always be: What are the
best bounds on probabilities that one can safely assume, taking into account only the given
rules, facts, and assessments? From this point of view, Examples 9, 11, and 12 are entirely
justified: the options given to the program are not decided by the given information, so
one must leave them open. In particular Example 11 seems to be an excellent argument for
the credal semantics: basically, the program generates all 3-colorings of a given graph; why
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should we insist on singling out a distribution over colorings when no preference over them
is expressed?
All in all, we find that the credal semantics is conceptually stronger than the well-founded
semantics, even though the latter is uniquely defined for every plp. We now examine the
structural and computation properties of these two semantics; a final comparison is left to
Section 9.
5 The structure of credal semantics
Given the generality of plps, one might think that credal sets generated by the credal
semantics could have an arbitrarily complex structure. Surprisingly, the structure of the
credal semantics of a plp is a relatively simple object:
Theorem 14. Given a consistent plp, its credal semantics is a set of probability measures
that dominate an infinitely monotone Choquet capacity.
Before we present a proof of this theorem, let us pause and define a few terms. An
infinitely monotone Choquet capacity is a set function P from an algebra A on a set Ω to
the real interval [0, 1] such that (Augustin et al., 2014, Definition 4.2): P(Ω) = 1−P(∅) = 1
and, for any A1, . . . , An in the algebra, P(∪iAi) ≥
∑
J⊆{1,...,n}(−1)
|J |+1
P(∩j∈JAj). Infinitely
monotone Choquet capacities appear in several formalisms; for instance, they are the belief
functions of Dempster-Shafer theory (Shafer, 1976), summaries of random sets (Molchanov,
2005), and inner measures (Fagin & Halpern, 1991).
Given an infinitely monotone Choquet capacity P, we can construct a set of measures
that dominate P; this is the set {P : ∀A ∈ A : P(A) ≥ P(A)}. We abuse language and say
that a set consisting of all measures that dominate an infinitely monotone Choquet capacity
is an infinitely monotone credal set. If a credal set K is infinitely monotone, then the lower
probability P, defined as P(A) = infP∈K P(A), is exactly the generating infinitely monotone
Choquet capacity. We also have the upper probability P(A) = supP∈K P(A) = 1− P(A
c).
Proof of Theorem 14. Consider a set Θ containing as states the posssible total choices of
the plp. Over this space we have a product measure that is completely specified by the
probabilities attached to probabilistic facts. Now consider a multi-valued mapping Γ be-
tween Θ and the space Ω of all possible models of our probabilistic logic program. For each
element θ ∈ Θ, define Γ(θ) to be the set of stable models associated with the total choice θ
of the probabilistic facts. Now we use the fact that a probability space and a multi-valued
mapping induce an infinite monotone Choquet capacity over the range of the mapping (that
is, over Ω) (Molchanov, 2005).
Infinitely monotone credal sets have several useful properties; for one thing they are
closed and convex. Convexity here means that if P1 and P2 are in the credal set, then
αP1 + (1 − α)P2 is also in the credal set for α ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, as illustrated by Example 9.
Corollary 15. Given a consistent plp, its credal semantics is a closed and convex set of
probability measures.
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There are several additional results concerning the representation of infinitely monotone
capacities using their Möbius transforms (Augustin et al., 2014; Shafer, 1976); we refrain
from mentioning every possible corollary we might produce by rehashing those results.
Instead, we focus on a few important results that can be used to great effect in future
applications. First, as we have a finite Herbrand base, we can use the symbols in the proof
of Theorem 14 to write, for any set of models M (Augustin et al., 2014, Section 5.3.2):
P(M) =
∑
θ∈Θ:Γ(θ)⊆M P(θ) , P(M) =
∑
θ∈Θ:Γ(θ)∩M6=∅ P(θ) . (5)
Suppose we are interested in the probability of a setQ of truth assignments for ground atoms
in the Herbrand base of the union of program P with all facts in PF. A direct translation
of Expression (5) leads to an algorithm that computes bounds on P(Q) as follows:
• Given a plp 〈P,PF〉 and Q, initialize a and b with 0.
• For each total choice θ of probabilistic facts, compute the set S of all stable models
of P ∪PF↓θ, and:
– if Q is true in every stable model in S, then a← a+ P(θ);
– if Q is true in some stable model of S, then b← b+ P(θ).
• Return [a, b] as the interval [P(Q) ,P(Q)].
Note that to find whether Q is true in every stable model of a program, we must run cautious
inference, and to find whether Q is true in some stable model of a program, we must run
brave inference. The complexity of these logical inferences have been studied in depth in
the literature (Eiter et al., 2007).
For infinitely monotone credal sets we can find easy expressions for lower and upper
conditional probabilities (that is, the infimum and supremum of conditional probabilities).
Indeed, if A and B are events, then the lower probability of A given B is (where the
superscript c denotes complement) (Augustin et al., 2014):
P(A|B) =
P(A ∩B)
P(A ∩B) + P(Ac ∩B)
(6)
when P(A ∩B) + P(Ac ∩B) > 0; we then have that P(A|B) = 1 when P(A ∩B) +
P(Ac ∩B) = 0 and P(A ∩B) > 0; finally, P(A|B) is undefined when P(A ∩B) = P(Ac ∩B) =
0 (as this condition is equivalent to P(B) = 0). Similarly, the upper probability of A given
B is:
P(A|B) =
P(A ∩B)
P(A ∩B) + P(Ac ∩B)
(7)
when P(A ∩B)+P(Ac ∩B) > 0; and we have that P(A|B) = 0when P(A ∩B)+P(Ac ∩B) =
0 and P(Ac ∩B) > 0; finally, P(A|B) is undefined when P(A ∩B) = P(Ac ∩B) = 0. We
also note that the computation of lower and upper expected values with respect to in-
finitely monotone Choquet capacities admits relatively simple expressions (Wasserman &
Kadane, 1992). For instance, the lower expectation E[f ] = infP∈K EP[f ], where f is a func-
tion over the truth assignments, and EP[f ] is the expectation of f with respect to P, is
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E[f ] =
∑
θ∈Θmaxω∈Γ(θ) f(ω) (Wasserman & Kadane, 1992). And there are expressions
even for lower and upper conditional expectations that mirror Expression (5).
To translate these expresions into actual computations, suppose we have a sets (Q and
E of truth assignments for ground atoms in the Herbrand base of the union of program P
with all facts in PF. To obtain bounds on P(Q|E), we can combine the previous algorithm
with Expressions (6) and (7), to obtain:
• Given a plp 〈P,PF〉 and Q, initialize a, b, c, and d with 0.
• For each total choice θ of probabilistic facts, compute the set S of all stable models
of P ∪PF↓θ, and:
– if Q ∪E is true in every stable model in S, then a← a+ P(θ);
– if Q ∪E is true in some stable model of S, then b← b+ P(θ);
– if Q if false and E is true in every stable model of S, then c← c+ P(θ);
– if Q if false and E is true in some stable model of S, then d← d+ P(θ).
• Return the interval [P(Q|E) ,P(Q,E)] as follows, in case b+d > 0 (otherwise, report
failure and stop):
– [0, 0] if b+ c = 0 and d > 0;
– [1, 1] if a+ d = 0 and b > 0;
– [a/(a + d), b/(b + c)] otherwise.
In fact the algorithm above has already been derived by Calì, Lukasiewicz, Predoiu,
and Stuckenschmidt (2009), using clever optimization techniques (note that Cali et al. use
a different strategy to handle the case where P(E) = 0). The advantage of our approach
is that the algorithm is a transparent consequence of known facts about capacities; other
than that, Cali et al. have already presented the algorithm so we do not need to dwell on
it. Rather, we later return to this algorithm with a focus on the complexity of computing
of the lower probability P(Q|E). Algorithms that reproduce some properties of infinitely
monotone Choquet capacities are also presented by Michels et al. (2015) in their work on
constraint logic programming.
6 The complexity of inferences: acyclic and stratified proba-
bilistic logic programs
In this section we focus on the computation of inferences for acyclic and stratified plps; in
these cases both the credal and the well-founded semantics agree. We focus on the following
decision problem:
Input: A plp 〈P,PF〉 whose probabilities are rational numbers, a pair (Q,E), called the
query, where both Q and E are sets of truth assignments to atoms in the Herbrand
base of the union of program P and all facts in PF, and a rational γ ∈ [0, 1].
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Output: Whether or not P(Q|E) > γ; by convention, output is NO (that is, input is
rejected) if P(E) = 0.
We refer to this complexity as the inferential complexity of plps. One may also be interested
in the complexity of inferences when the plp is fixed, and the only input is the query (Q,E).
This is the query complexity of the program; to define it, consider:
Fixed: A plp 〈P,PF〉, whose probabilities are rational numbers, that employs a vocabulary
R of predicates.
Input: A pair (Q,E), called the query, where both Q and E are sets of truth assignments
to atoms of predicates in R, and a rational γ ∈ [0, 1].
Output: Whether or not P(Q|E) > γ; by convention, output is NO if P(E) = 0.
Say that the query complexity of a class P of plps is in a complexity class C if the complexity
of this decision problem is in C for every plp in P. And say that the query complexity of
P is C-hard if each decision problem in C can be reduced, with many-one reductions, to
a decision problem for at least one plp in P. And say that the query complexity of P is
C-complete if P is both in C and C-hard.
In practice, one may face situations where a plp may be small compared to the query, or
where a single plp is queried many times; then query complexity is the concept of interest.
The definition of query complexity is clearly related to the concept of data complexity
found in database theory (Abiteboul, Hull, & Vianu, 1995); indeed we have used “data
complexity” in previous related work (Cozman & Mauá, 2015a). Here we prefer to use
“query” instead of “data” because usually data complexity fixes the rules and varies the
number of facts; in this paper we keep both rules and facts fixed. In fact, we have already
mentioned the highly relevant work by Ceylan et al. (2016), where they study the complexity
of various types of probabilistic logic programs; in that work they use data complexity to
refer to the complexity of computing probabilistic for fixed queries and fixed programs, as
the stock of facts and probabilistic facts varies. Note also that Ceylan et al. consider a
much more sophisticated language for queries that we do; for them, a query can be any
union of Boolean conjunctive query as usually employed in databases (Date, 2005). The
distinction between “query” and “data” thus seems significant in the context of probabilistic
logic programming.
We must further comment on a few parallel results by Ceylan et al. (2016). They analyze
the complexity of plps under two semantics; one of them is in line with Sato’s distribution
semantics, and another one is geared towards inconsistent programs; neither is equivalent
to the credal or the well-founded semantics. Moreover, they focus on queries that are
Boolean formulas, they do not allow for conditioning evidence, and they use a somewhat
different version of probabilistic facts called contexts (that can be reproduced with our
probabilistic facts). Despite these differences, in dealing with their first semantics they
prove statements that are related to results in Section 6.1. More precisely: by translating
the various languages and arguments appropriately, the points made by our Theorems 18
and 19 can be obtained from their results on full acyclic programs; also our Theorem 22 is
comparable to their corresponding result, even though our “query” complexity is not their
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burglary
earthquake
alarm
a1 a2 a3
P(burglary = true) = 0.7
P(earthquake = true) = 0.2
P(a1 = true) = 0.9
P(a2 = true) = 0.8
P(a3 = true) = 0.1
alarm ⇔ (burglary ∧ earthquake ∧ a)∨
(burglary ∧ ¬earthquake ∧ b)∨
(¬burglary ∧ earthquake ∧ c)
Figure 4: Bayesian network extracted from the propositional portion of Example 5.
“data” complexity.3 We decided to include our proof of Theorem 19 in full here because we
need the techniques in later proofs, and because we find that our techniques illuminate the
matter adequately.
6.1 Acyclic probabilistic logic programs
We start with acyclic plps. In this case the credal and the well-founded semantics define a
single distribution, given by a Bayesian network whose structure is the program’s grounded
dependency graph, and whose parameters are obtained from the program’s Clark completion
(Poole, 1993, 2008).
Example 16. Take a simplified version of the plp in Example 5, without predicates calls
and neighbor:
0.7 :: burglary. 0.2 :: earthquake.
alarm :− burglary, earthquake, a1.
alarm :− burglary,not earthquake, a2.
alarm :− not burglary, earthquake, a3.
0.9 :: a1. 0.8 :: a2. 0.1 :: a3.
We can understand this plp as the specification of the Bayesian network in Figure 4. Note
that the structure of the network is just the grounded dependency graph, and the logical
sentence comes directly from the Clark completion. 
Conversely, any propositional Bayesian network can be specified by an acyclic proposi-
tional plp (Poole, 1993, 2008). The argument is simple, and we show it by turning Example
16 upside down:
Example 17. Suppose we have the Bayesian network in Figure 5. This Bayesian network
is equivalent to the Bayesian network in Figure 4 (that is: the same distribution is defined
over alarm, burglary, earthquake). And the latter network is specified by an acyclic plp. 
By combining these arguments, we see that inference in acyclic propositional plps has
the complexity of inference in Bayesian networks (Darwiche, 2009; Roth, 1996):
Theorem 18. The inferential complexity of inference in acyclic propositional plps is PP-
complete.
3We note that our results on acyclic programs appeared (Cozman & Mauá, 2016) almost simultaneously
to the publication by Ceylan et al. (2016), and were produced independently.
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burglary
earthquake
alarmP(burglary = true) = 0.7
P(earthquake = true) = 0.2
P(alarm = true|burglary = true, earthquake = true) = 0.9
P(alarm = true|burglary = true, earthquake = false) = 0.8
P(alarm = true|burglary = false, earthquake = true) = 0.1
P(alarm = true|burglary = false, earthquake = false) = 0.0
Figure 5: Bayesian network equivalent to the Bayesian network in Figure 4.
One might suspect that a bound on predicate arity would yield the same PP-completeness,
because the grounding of a plp would then produce only polynomially-many ground atoms.
Surprisingly, this is not the case here, as shown by the next theorem.
Theorem 19. The inferential complexity of inference in acyclic plps with bounded predicate
arity is PPNP-complete.
Proof. To prove membership, start with the “unconditional” decision P(Q) > γ. This de-
cision problem is in PPNP; this follows from the fact that logical reasoning with acyclic
normal logic programs is ∆P2 -complete (Eiter et al., 2007, Table 5) (that is, P
NP-complete).
Consider a nondeterministic Turing machine that goes through all probabilistic facts. For
each probabilistic fact α :: A., where α is a rational such that α = µ/ν for some (smallest)
integers µ and ν, the machine nondeterministically decides whether to keep A as a fact or
discard it; then the machine creates µ computation paths if A is to be kept (all these com-
putational paths reach the same point), and ν−µ computation paths if A is to be discarded
(again, these computation paths reach the same point). Note that these computation paths
can be created with polynomial effort even if µ and ν are specified in binary notation. Then,
for the particular selection of probabilistic facts that are not discarded, the machine pro-
cesses the resulting acyclic normal logic program: logical reasoning can determine whether
any set of truth assignments, for atoms in the Herbrand base, hold or not. The input is in
the language if more than half the computation paths of this machine are accepting paths.
This decides whether P(Q) > 1/2.
Now consider membership of the decision P(Q|E) > γ; we process this decision as
follows.4 Suppose the query consists of Q = {Q1, . . . , Qn} and E = {E1, . . . , Em}, where
each Qi and each Ej is a literal. The simpler case is γ ≥ 1/2, so assume it to begin.
Then, as the query is processed, introduce aux1 :− Q1, . . . , Qn., aux2 :− E1, . . . , Em.,
aux3 :− aux1, aux2, aux4., aux3 :− not aux2, aux5., where each literal Qi or Ej is written
as the corresponding subgoal, and (1/(2γ)) :: aux4., 0.5 :: aux5.. Thus P(aux3 = true) >
1/2 ⇔ (1/(2γ))P(Q,E) + (1/2)(1 − P(E)) > 1/2 ⇔ P(Q|E) > γ (that is, the decision on
P(aux3 = 1) > 1/2 yields the decision on P(Q|E) > γ). Now if γ < 1/2, then introduce
aux3 :− not aux1, aux2, aux6., remove aux4, and introduce (1− 2γ)/(2− 2γ) :: aux6.. Thus
P(aux3 = true) > 1/2⇔ P(Q,E) + (1− 2γ)/(2− 2γ)(P(E)− P(Q,E)) + (1/2)(1− P(E)) >
1/2⇔ P(Q|E) > γ, as desired. (This technique is used several times in latter proofs.)
4We are indebted to Cassio Polpo de Campos for suggesting this technique; the probabilities attached to
probabilistic facts are as proposed by Park and described by Darwiche (2009, Theorem 11.5).
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Hardness is shown by building a plp that solves the problem #13CNF(>) as defined in
Section 2.2; that is, one has a propositional sentence φ in 3CNF with two sets of logical
variables X and Y, and the goal is to decide whether the number of truth assignments for X
that satisfy ∃Y : φ(X,Y) is larger than a given integer M . We take φ to be a conjunction
of clauses c1, . . . ck; each clause cj contains an ordered triplet of propositional variables.
For instance, we might have as input the integer M = 1 and the formula
ϕ(x1, x2, y1) ≡ (¬x1 ∨ x2 ∨ y1) ∧ (x1 ∨ ¬x2 ∨ y1) ∧ (¬y1 ∨ ¬y1 ∨ ¬y1). (8)
In this case the input is accepted (the number of satisfying assignments is 2). Note that the
last clause is equivalent to ¬y1; we pad the clause so as to have three literals in it.
For each propositional variable yi, we introduce a corresponding logical variable Yi. The
ordered tuple of propositional variables in clause cj corresponds to a tuple of propositional
variables that is denoted by Yj ; these are the propositional variables in cj that belong to
Y. In Expression (8), Y1 = Y2 = Y3 = [Y1].
We use a few constants and predicates. Two constants, 0 and 1, stand for false and
true respectively. Also, we use 0-arity predicates xi, each one standing for a propositional
variable xi in X. And we use predicates c1, . . . , ck, each one standing for a clause cj . The
arity of each cj is the length of Yj, denoted by dj .
For each cj, go over the 2dj possible assignments of Yj . That is, if dj = 1, then go over
cj(0) and cj(1); if dj = 2, then go over cj(0, 0), cj(0, 1), cj(1, 0) and cj(1, 1). And if dj = 3,
go over the 8 assignments. Note that if dj = 0, there is only one “empty” assignment to
visit. Thus there are at most 8k assignments to consider.
Suppose then that we have predicate cj, and we take the assignment y (which may be
empty). If cj is true for y, regardless of the possible assignments for propositional variables
xi, then just introduce the fact
cj(y).
If instead cj is false for y, regardless of the possible assignments for propositional variables
xi, then just move to another assignment (that is, there are no propositional variables xi in
cj , and the clause is false for y; by leaving cj(y), we guarantee that it is forced to be false
by the semantics). Otherwise, there are propositional variables in X that affect the truth
value of cj when y is fixed; there may be one, two or three such propositional variables.
Take the first one of them, denoted by xj1, and introduce the rule
cj(y) :−
{
xj1. if the literal for xj1 does not contain negation; or
not xj1. if the literal for xj1 contains negation.
If there is a second propositional variable xj2 that affects the truth value of cj when y is
fixed, add a similar rule cj(y) :− [not] xj2. And similarly if there is a third propositional
variable xj3 that affects the truth value of cj. Note that these rules create a disjunction for
cj, in effect encoding the clause cj for fixed y.
Finally, introduce the rule
cnf :− c1(Y1), c2(Y2), . . . , ck(Yk).
and probabilistic facts (one per predicate xi)
0.5 :: xi.
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The Clark completion of the plp just constructed encodes the #13CNF(>) problem of
interest, thus proving PPNP-hardness: to determine whether ∃Y : φ(X,Y) has more than
M satisfying assignments, decide whether P(cnf = true) > M/2n, where n is the number of
propositional variables in X.
For instance, given the formula in Expression (8), generate the following plp:
c1(0) :− not x1 . c1(0) :− x2 . c1(1).
c2(0) :− x1 . c2(0) :− not x2 . c2(1).
c3(0).
cnf :− c1(Y1), c2(Y1), c3(Y1).
0.5 :: x1. 0.5 :: x2.
By determining whether P(cnf = true) > M/22, we decide whether the number of truth
assignments for x1 and x2 such that ∀y1ϕ(x1, x2, y1) holds is larger than M .
Intuitively, this results shows that, to produce an inference for a plp with bounded pred-
icate arity, one must go through the truth assignments for polynomially many groundings,
guessing one at a time (thus a counting nondeterministic Turing machine), and, for each
assignment, it is then necessary to use an NP-oracle to construct the probability values.
Theorem 19 suggests that acyclic plps capture a larger set of probabilistic languages than
many probabilistic relational models that stay within PP (Cozman & Mauá, 2015b).
The next step is to remove the bound on arity. We obtain:
Theorem 20. The inferential complexity of inference in acyclic plps is PEXP-complete.
Proof. Membership follows from grounding the plp.5 If the plp has n constants, then a
relation of arity k produces nk groundings. Each one of these exponentially many groudings
corresponds to a node of a (necessarily acyclic) Bayesian network. To write down the
conditional probabilities associated with each node of the grounded Bayesian network, take
the Clark completion of the program, and ground the expresions. For each non-root node we
have a first-order formula that can be written as a possibly exponentially-long quantifier-
free formula. Now to determine whether P(Q) > 1/2, we can use a probabilistic Turing
machine that runs inference for the exponentially large (grounded) Bayesian network (or,
rather, there is an exponential-time Turing machine that guesses a truth assignment for
all grounded probabilistic facs, and for each such truth assignment, computes the truth
assignment for any other atom by going through the possibly exponentially large non-root
node completions).
To prove hardness, we encode an exponential-time nondeterministic Turing machine M
using logical formulas that are directly produced by the Clark completion of an acyclic
normal logic program P. Assume that M can solve some PEXP-complete problem; that is,
for a PEXP-complete language L, ℓ ∈ L iff M halts within time 2n with more than half of
paths accepting ℓ, where n is some polynomial on the length of ℓ. We also add probabilistic
facts PF to P, so that an inference in the resulting plp decides whether the number of
5A short proof of membership is obtained by applying the same concise argument used in the proof
of Theorem 24(c); here we present a longer but possibly more intuitive argument based on inference on
Bayesian networks.
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acceptings paths of M is larger than half of the total number of computation paths (thus
deciding the same language as M does). So, consider the encoding of Turing machines that
is described by Grädel (2007, Theorem 3.2.4), summarized as follows. Suppose M has states
q, with an initial state q0, an accepting state qa, and a rejecting state qr; suppose also that
M uses an alphabet with symbols σ (in the alphabet there is a blank symbol ⊔); finally
suppose that M has a transition function δ that takes a pair (q, σ), understood as state q
and symbol σ read by the machine head, and returns one of a number of triplets (q′, σ′,m),
where q′ is the next state, σ′ is the symbol to be written at the tape, and m is either −1
(head goes to the left), 0 (head stays at the same position), and 1 (head goes to the right).
Assume that the alphabet is enlarged so that every pair (q, σ) is also a possible symbol.
The input to the machine is a sequence of symbols (q0, σ10), σ
2
0 , . . . , σ
m
0 , and a configuration
of the tape is σ1, σ2, . . . , (q, σ), . . . , σ2n (note that the “useful” portion of the tape runs from
position 1 to position 2n).
The encoding of M is obtained by introducing a number of predicates and a number
of first-order sentences φi; when all these sentences hold, then any interpretation for the
predicates is an accepting computation. We omit the logical expressions of this encoding
as they can be taken from Grädel’s presentation. In any case, if we decide whether the
number of interpretations for the predicates in these sentences is larger than half of the
number of possible interpretations, we obtain the desired decision. We enforce each sentence
φi by introducing a predicate auxi and a rule auxi :− φi (where we write φi in the rule
with the understanding that φi is obtained as the Clark completion of a set of auxiliary
predicates and rules; recall that conjunction, disjunction and negation are available, as well
as existential quantifiers; universal quantifiers are produced by negating existential ones);
then the sentence φi holds when {auxi = true} holds. We simply collect all these truth
assignments in the set E. Now, we must have one of the sentences in M’s encoding as a
“detector” for the accepting state; that is, ∃X : stateqa(X), whereX indexes the computation
steps, and stateqa(X) is a predicate that indicates that at computation step X the state is
stateqa. Denote by auxa the auxiliary predicate associated with the latter sentence. At this
point we can reproduce the behavior of M if we focus on interpretations that satisfy E. The
next step is to encode the input. Now, the input symbols can be inserted by appropriate
facts (these facts refer to predicates introduced in the encoding). And the final step is
to count the accepting computations. First we must assume that, once M reaches qa or
qr, it stays with the same configuration (it just keeps repeating the state and the tape),
so that the number of accepting paths is the same number of interpretations that satisfy
{auxa = true}; this assumption is harmless as M can always be modified to do it. Then we
add, for each predicate r that is introduced in the construction, except the ones in E, the
probabilistic fact 0.5 :: r(X1, . . . ,Xk), where k is the arity of r. Given all of this, the decision
P(auxa = true|E) > 1/2 determines whether the number of “accepting” interpretations for
M is larger than half the number of intepretations for M. Thus hardness obtains.
Consider query complexity. The following result is handy:
Theorem 21. Query complexity is PP-hard for the following plp:
0.5 :: t(X) . 0.5 :: pos(X,Y ) . 0.5 :: neg(X,Y ) .
c(Y ) :− pos(X,Y ), t(X) . c(Y ) :− neg(X,Y ),not t(X) .
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Proof. Consider a CNF formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) with clauses c1, . . . , cm and propositional
variables x1, . . . , xn. Let Pj (resp., Nj) be a vector denoting the indices of the positive
(negative) literals xi (¬xi) in clause j. We can encode the truth-value of a clause cj as c(j),
the truth-value of xi as t(i), and the occurrence of a positive (negative) literal xi ∈ Pj (xi ∈
Nj) as pos(i, j) (neg(i, j)). So assemble a query Q containing assignments to {c(j) = true}
for j = 1, . . . ,m, {pos(i, j) = true} for i ∈ Pj , j = 1, . . . ,m, {neg(i, j) = true} for i ∈ Nj, j =
1 . . . ,m. Now if a grounding of pos or neg is not already assigned true, then assign it to false
and add this assignment to Q. The Clark completion defines c(j)⇔
∨
i∈Pj
t(i)∨
∨
i∈Nj
¬t(i)
for every cj. And the number of assignments to x1, . . . , xn that satisfy ϕ is larger than M
iff P(Q) > M/22s
2+s where s = max(m,n); hence the desired hardness obtains.
Consequently:
Theorem 22. The query complexity of inference for acyclic plps is PP-complete.
Proof. Hardness follows from Theorem 21. Membership is obtained using the same reasoning
in the proof of Theorem 19, only noting that, once the probabilistic facts are selected, logical
reasoning with the resulting acyclic normal logic program can be done with polynomial effort
(Dantsin et al., 2001, Theorem 5.1); thus P(Q) > γ can be decided within PP.
There are subclasses of acyclic plps that characterize well-known tractable Bayesian
networks. An obvious one is the class of propositional acyclic programs whose grounded
dependency graph has bounded treewidth, as Bayesian networks subject to such a bound
are tractable (Koller & Friedman, 2009). As another interesting example, consider the two-
level networks that are processed by the Quick-Score algorithm (Heckerman, 1990); that
is, two-level networks where the top level consists of marginally independent “diseases” and
the bottom level consists of “findings” that are conditionally independent given the diseases,
and that are determined by noisy-or gates. Such a network can be easily encoded using a
propositional acyclic plp; these plps inherit the fact that inference is polynomial when Q
contains only negated atoms (that is, only false). Alas, this tractability result is quite fragile,
as “positive” evidence breaks polynomial behavior as long as P 6= NP (Shimony & Domshlak,
2003). Yet another tractable class consists of acyclic definite propositional plps such that
each atom is the head of at most one rule: inference in this class is polynomial when Q
contains only true. This is obtained by noting that the Clark completion of these programs
produces Bayesian networks that are specified using only conjunction, and a polynomial
algorithm obtains from results by Cozman and Mauá (2015a). This is also a fragile result:
Proposition 23. Inference for the class of acyclic propositional plps such that each atom
is the head of at most one rule is PP-complete even if (a) Q contains only true but the
program contains not; (b) the program is definite but Q contains false.
Proof. Membership follows, for both (a) and (b), from Theorem 18. So, consider hardness.
Any plp in Case (b) produces, as its Clark completion, a Bayesian network that is specified
using conjunctions; inference for this sort of Bayesian network is PP-complete when evidence
can be “negative” (Cozman & Mauá, 2016). Hardness for Case (a) then obtains easily,
because one can use negation to turn “positive” evidence into “negative” evidence.
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6.2 Stratified probabilistic logic programs
A stratified normal logic program has the useful property that its universally adopted seman-
tics produces a single interpretation (and is equal to its stable and well-founded semantics).
Because every total choice of a stratified plp produces a stratified normal logic program,
the credal/well-founded semantics of a stratified plp is a unique distribution.
One might fear that in moving from acyclic to stratified programs we must pay a large
penalty. This is not the case: the complexity classes remain the same as in Section 6.1:
Theorem 24. For locally stratified plps, inferential complexity is PEXP-complete; it is
PPNP-complete for plps with bounded predicate arity; it is PP-complete for propositional
plps. For locally stratified plps, query complexity is PP-complete.
Proof. For propositional stratified plps, hardness comes from the fact that a Bayesian
network on binary random variables can be encoded by a stratified program (indeed, by
an acyclic program), and inference with such networks is PP-complete (Darwiche, 2009;
Roth, 1996). Membership is obtained using the same reasoning in the proof of Theorem
19, only noting that, once the probabilistic facts are selected, logical reasoning with the
resulting stratified normal logic program can be done with polynomial effort (Eiter et al.,
2007, Table 2).
For stratified programs with bounded predicate arity, hardness follows from Theorem 19.
Membership is obtained using the same reasoning in the proof of Theorem 19; in fact that
proof of membership applies directly to stratified programs with bounded arity.
For general stratified plps, hardness is argued as in the proof of Theorem 20. Member-
ship follows from the fact that we can ground the plp into an exponentially large propo-
sitional plp. Once the (exponentially-many) probabilistic facts are selected, the Turing
machine is left with a stratified propositional normal logic program, and logical inference is
polynomial in the size of this program (that is, logical inference requires exponential effort).
Finally, hardness of query complexity follows from Theorem 21. Membership is obtained
using the same reasoning in the proof of Theorem 19, only noting that, once the probabilistic
facts are selected, logical reasoning with the resulting stratified normal logic program can be
done with polynomial effort as guaranteed by the analysis of data complexity of stratified
normal logic programs (Dantsin et al., 2001).
We noted, at the end of Section 6.1, that some sub-classes of acyclic programs display
polynomial behavior. We now show an analogue result for a sub-class of definite (and
therefore stratified, but possibly cyclic) programs with unary and binary predicates:
Proposition 25. Inferential complexity is polynomial for queries containing only true, for
plps where: (a) every predicate is unary or binary, and facts can be asserted about them;
(b) probabilistic facts can be of the form α :: a(X)., α :: a(a), α :: r(X,Y ) (that is, each
unary predicate can be associated with ground or non-ground probabilistic facts, while each
binary predicate can be associated to a particular non-ground probabilistic fact); (c) no binary
predicate is the head of a rule that has a body; (d) each atom is the head of at most one rule
that has a body, and only the three following rule forms are allowed:
a(X) :− a1(X), . . . , ak(X) . a(X) :− r(X,Y ) . a(X) :− r(Y,X) ..
29
Proof. We show that the inference can be reduced to a tractable weighted model counting
problem. First, ground the program in polynomial time (because each rule has at most two
logical variables). Since the resulting program is definite, only atoms that are ancestors of
the queries in the grounded dependency graph are relevant for determining the truth-value
of the query in any logic program induced by a total choice (this follows as resolution is
complete for propositional definite programs). Thus, discard all atoms that are not ancestors
of a query atom. For the query to be true, the remaining atoms that are not probabilistic
facts are forced to be true by the semantics. So collect all rules of the sort a(a) :− r(a, b) .,
a(a) :− r(b, a) ., plus all facts and all probabilistic facts. This is an acyclic program, so
that its Clark completion gives the stable model semantics. This completion is a formula
containing a conjunction of subformulas a(a) ⇔
∨
b r(a, b), a(a) ⇔
∨
a r(a, b), and unit
(weighted) clauses corresponding to (probabilistic) facts. The query is satisfied only on
models where the lefthand side of the definitions are true, which is equivalent to reducing
the subformulas to their righthand side. The resulting weighted model counting problem
has been shown to be polynomial-time solvable (Mauá & Cozman, 2015).
7 The complexity of inferences: credal semantics
Now consider plps that may be non-stratified. We have to adapt the definitions of inferential
and query complexity to account for the fact that we now have lower and upper probabilities.
First we focus on lower probabilities; the lower-probability version of inferential complexity
for a class of plps is the complexity of the following decision problem:
Input: A plp 〈P,PF〉 whose probabilities are rational numbers, a pair (Q,E), called the
query, where both Q and E are sets of truth assignments to atoms in the Herbrand
base of the union of program P and all facts in PF, and a rational γ ∈ [0, 1].
Output: Whether or not P(Q|E) > γ; by convention, output is NO (that is, input is
rejected) if P(E) = 0.
The lower-probability version of query complexity is, accordingly:
Fixed: A plp 〈P,PF〉, whose probabilities are rational numbers, that employs a vocabulary
R of predicates.
Input: A pair (Q,E), called the query, where both Q and E are sets of truth assignments
to atoms of predicates in R, and a rational γ ∈ [0, 1].
Output: Whether or not P(Q|E) > γ; by convention, output is NO if P(E) = 0.
So, we are ready to state our main results on complexity for the credal semantics. To
understand these results, consider the computation of lower probabilities by the algorithms
in Section 5: the basic idea is to go through all possible configurations of probabilistic facts,
and each configuration requires runs of cautious/brave inference (that it, it is necessary
to check whether all possible stable models satisfy Q ∩ E, and whether all possible stable
models fail to satisfy Q while satisfying E. Thus the proof strategies employed previously
can be adapted to some extent, by using cautious/brave inference in our Turing machines.
We have:
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Theorem 26. Adopt the credal semantics for plps, and assume that input plps are con-
sistent. The lower-probability version of inferential complexity is PPNP
NP
-complete for plps
where all predicates have a bound on arity, and PPNP-complete for propositional plps. The
lower-probability version of query complexity is PPNP-complete.
Proof. We first focus on propositional programs.
To prove membership, we describe a polynomial time nondeterministic Turing machine
such that more than half of its computation paths, on a given input, end up accepting iff the
input is an YES instance. The machine receives the plp 〈P,PF〉, the pair (Q,E), and the
rational γ ∈ [0, 1] as input. In case P(Q,E) + P(¬Q,E) > 0, where we use ¬Q to indicate
that Q does not hold, we have to decide whether:
P(Q,E)
P(Q,E) + P(¬Q,E)
> γ ⇔ (1− γ)P(Q,E) > γP(¬Q,E) .
Write γ as µ/ν for the smallest possible integers µ and ν, such that ν > 0, to conclude that
our decision is whether
(ν − µ)P(Q,E) > µP(¬Q,E) . (9)
In case P(Q,E) + P(¬Q,E) = 0, there are a few cases to consider, as indicated by the
discussion around Expression (6). First, if P(Q ∩E) = 0, the machine must return NO
(numeric probability value is not defined); and if P(Q ∩E) > 0, the machine must return
NO if γ = 1 and YES if γ < 1. One simple way to capture all these cases is this: if
P(Q,E) > 0 and P(¬Q,E) = 0 and γ < 1, then return YES and stop; otherwise return
YES or NO according to inequality in Expression (9). Thus the machine starts by handling
the special case in the previous sentence. If γ < 1, then the machine determines whether
P(Q ∩E) > 0 and P(¬Q ∩E) = 0 using the NP oracle twice. In each case, the oracle guesses
a total choice and determines, using brave inference, whether there is a stable model that
satisfies the event of interest. If there is no such total choice, then the upper probability is
zero. So, if γ < 1 and P(Q ∩E) > 0 and P(¬Q ∩E) = 0, move into the accepting state;
otherwise, move to some state q and continue.
From q, the machine “goes through” the possible selections of probabilistic facts, operat-
ing similarly to the second algorithm in Section 5. We will use the fact that cautious logical
reasoning is coNP-complete and brave logical reasoning is NP-complete (Eiter et al., 2007,
Table 2).
The machine proceeds from q as in the proof of Theorem 19, nondeterministically se-
lecting whether each fact is kept or discarded. Suppose we have n ground probabilistic facts
α1 :: A1., . . . , αn :: An.. For each probabilistic fact αi :: Ai., where αi = µi/νi for smallest
integers µi and νi such that νi > 0, the machine creates µi computation paths out of the
decision to keep Ai, and νi − µi computation paths out of the decision to discard Ai. Note
that after guessing the status of each probabilistic fact the machine may branch in at most
νi paths, and the total number of paths out of this sequence of decisions is
∏n
i=1 νi. Denote
this latter number by N . At this point the machine has a normal logic program, and it
runs cautious inference to determine whether Q∩E holds in every stable model of this pro-
gram. Cautious logical reasoning is solved by the NP oracle. If indeed Q∩E holds in every
stable model of this program, the machine moves to state q1. Otherwise, the machine runs
brave inference to determine whether Q is false while E is true in some stable model of the
31
program. Brave logical reasoning is solved by the NP oracle. And if indeed Q is false while
E is true in some stable model of the program, the machine moves to state q2. Otherwise,
the machine moves to state q3. Denote by N1 the number of computation paths that arrive
at q1, and similarly for N2 and N3. From q1 the machine branches into ν − µ computation
paths that all arrive at the accepting state (thus there are (ν − µ)N1 paths through q1 to
the accepting state). And from q2 the machine branches into µ computation paths that all
arrive at the rejecting state. Finally, from q3 the machine nondeterministically moves either
into the accepting or the rejecting state. Thus the number of accepting computation paths
is larger than the number of rejecting computation paths iff
(ν − µ)N1 +N3 > µN2 +N3 ⇔ (ν − µ)
N1
N
> µ
N2
N
.
Note that, by construction, N1/N = P(Q,E) and N2/N = P(¬Q,E); thus the number of
accepting computation paths is larger than the number of rejecting computation paths iff
(ν − µ)P(Q,E) > µP(¬Q,E) .
Membership is thus proved.
Hardness is shown by a reduction from the problem #1DNF(>): Decide whether the
number of assignments of X such that the formula φ(X) = ∀Y : ϕ(X,Y) holds is strictly
larger than M , where ϕ is a propositional formula in DNF with conjuncts d1, . . . , dk (and
X = {x1, . . . , xn} and Y = {y1, . . . , ym} are sets of propositional variables). Introduce xi
for each xi and yi for each yi, and encode φ as follows. Each conjunct dj is represented by
a predicate dj and a rule dj :− s1, . . . , sr., where si stands for a properly encoded subgoal:
either some xi, or not xi, or some yi, or not yi. And then introduce k rules dnf :− dj.,
one per conjunct. Note that for a fixed truth assignment for all xi and all yi, dnf is true
iff ϕ holds. Now introduce probabilistic facts 0.5 :: xi, one for each xi. There are then 2n
possible ways to select probabilistic facts. The remaining problem is to encode the univeral
quantifier over the yi. To do so, introduce a pair of rules for each yi,
yi :− not nyi. and nyi :− not yi..
Thus there are 2m stable models running through assignments of y1, . . . , ym, for each fixed
selection of probabilistic facts. By Expression (5) we have that P(dnf = true) is equal to∑
θmin f(θ)/2
n, where θ denotes a total choice, the minimum is over all stable models
produced by P ∪ PF↓θ, and f(θ) is a function that yields 1 if dnf is true and 0 otherwise.
Now min f(θ) yields 1 iff for all Y we have that ϕ(X,Y) is true, where X is fixed by θ.
Hence P(dnf = true) > M/2n iff the input problem is accepted. Hardness is thus proved.
Now consider plps where predicates have bounded arity.
Membership follows using the same construction described for the propositional case, but
using a ΣP2 oracle as cautious logical reasoning is Π
P
2 -complete and brave logical reasoning
is ΣP2 -complete (Eiter et al., 2007, Table 5).
Hardness is shown by a reduction from #23CNF(>): Decide whether the number of
assignments of X such that the formula φ(X) = ∀Z : ∃Y : ϕ(X,Y,Z) holds is strictly
larger than M , where ϕ is a propositional formula in 3CNF with clauses c1, . . . , ck (and
X, Y, and Z are sets of propositional variables, and X contains n propositional variables).
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We proceed exactly as in the proof of hardness for Theorem 19; each propositional variable
yi now appears as a logical variable Yi, while each propositional variable xi appears as a
predicate xi. The novelty is that each propositional variable zi appears as a predicate zi that
receive the same treatment as predicates yi in the proof for the propositional case. So, just
repeat the whole translation of the formula ϕ used in the proof of Theorem 19, with the
only difference that now there may be propositional variables zi in the formula, and these
propositional variables appear as predicates zi in the plp. Then introduce, for each zi, a
pair of rules
zi :− not nzi. and nzi :− not zi..
Again, for each fixed selection of probabilistic facts, there are stable models, one per assign-
ment of Z. And P(cnf = true) > M/2n iff the input problem is accepted.
Finally, consider query complexity.
Membership follows using the same construction described for the propositional case,
but using a NP oracle as cautious logical reasoning is coNP-complete and brave logical
reasoning is NP-complete (Dantsin et al., 2001, Theorem 5.8).
Hardness follows again by a reduction from #1DNF(>); that is, again we must decide
whether the number of assignments of X such that ∀Y : ϕ(X,Y) holds is strictly larger
than M , where ϕ is a formula in DNF (again, the number of propositional variables in
X is n, and the number of propositional variables in Y is m). We employ a construction
inspired by the proof of Theorem 21, using the following fixed plp. Note that x stands for
the propositional variables in X, where counting operates; y stands for the propositional
variables in Y, where the universal quantifier operates; c stands for clauses that are then
negated to obtain the DNF:
0.5 :: x(V ) .
0.5 :: select1(U, V ). 0.5 :: select2(U, V ).
0.5 :: select3(U, V ). 0.5 :: select4(U, V ).
y(V ) :− not ny(V ). ny(V ) :− not y(V ).
c(V ) :− select1(U, V ), x(U) .
c(V ) :− select2(U, V ),not x(U) .
c(V ) :− select3(U, V ), y(U) .
c(V ) :− select4(U, V ),not y(U) .
d(V ) :− not c(V ).
aux :− d(V ).
dnf :− not aux.
By providing select1, select2, select3 and select4 as Q, we can encode the formula ϕ. Add
to Q the assignment {dnf = 1}, and then P(Q) > M/24s
2+s, where s = max(m,n), iff the
input problem is accepted. 
Theorem 26 focuses on the computation of lower probabilities. We can of course define
the upper-probability versions of inferential and query complexities, by replacing the decision
P(Q|E) > γ with P(Q|E) > γ. If anything, this latter decision leads to easier proofs of
membership, for all special cases are dealt with by deciding whether
(ν − µ)P(Q,E) > µP(¬Q,E) ,
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where again γ = µ/ν. All other points in the membership proofs remain the same, once brave
and cautious reasoning are exchanged. Several arguments concerning hardness can also be
easily adapted. For instance, PPNP-hardness for propositional programs can be proved
by reducting from #1CNF(>), by encoding a formula in CNF. Similarly, PP
NP-hardness for
query complexity reduces from #1CNF(>) by using the fixed program described in the proof
of Theorem 26 without the latter three rules (and query with assignments on groundings
of c).
Theorem 26 does not discuss the complexity of plps, under the credal semantics, without
a bound on arity. Without such a bound, logical cautious reasoning is coNEXP-complete, so
we conjecture that exponentially bounded counting Turing machines will be needed here.
We leave this conjecture as an open question.
Finally, our complexity results were obtained assuming that plps were consistent; of
course, in practice one must consider the problem of checking consistency. We have:
Proposition 27. Consistency checking is ΠP2 -complete for propositional plps and is Π
P
3 -
complete for plps where predicates have a bound on arity.
Proof. Membership of consistency checking of a propositional plp obtains by verifying
whether logical consistency holds for each total choice of probabilistic facts, and this can
be accomplished by deciding whether all total choices satisfy logical consistency (logical
consistency checking for this language is NP-complete (Eiter et al., 2007, Table 1)). An
analogue reasoning leads to membership in ΠP3 for plps with a bound on arity, as logical
consistency checking with bounded arity is ΣP2 -complete (Eiter et al., 2007, Table 4).
Now consider hardness in the propositional case. Take a sentence φ equal to ∀X : ∃Z :
ϕ(X,Z), where φ is a propositional formula in 3CNF with clauses c1, . . . , ck, and vectors
of propositional variables X and Z. Deciding the satisfiability of such a formula is a ΠP2 -
complete problem (Marx, 2011). So, introduce a predicate xi for each xi, associated with a
probabilistic fact 0.5 :: xi., and a predicate zi for each zi, associated with rules
zi :− not nzi. and nzi :− not zi..
Now encode the formula φ as follows. For each clause cj with three literals, add the rules
cj :− ℓ1., cj :− ℓ2., and cj :− ℓ3., where each ℓi stands for a subgoal containing a predicate
in x1, . . . , xn or in z1, . . . , zm, perhaps preceded by not, as appropriate (mimicking a similar
construction in the proof of Theorem 19). Then add a rule
cnf :− c1, . . . , ck.
to build the formula ϕ, and an additional rule
clash :− not clash,not cnf.
to force cnf to be true in any stable model. The question of whether this program has a stable
model for every configuration of X then solves the original question about satisfiability of
φ.
Finally, consider hardness in the relational (bounded arity) case. Take a sentence φ
equal to ∀X : ∃Z : ¬∃Y : ϕ(X,Y,Z), where ϕ is a propositional formula in 3CNF; deciding
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the satisfiability of this formula is a ΠP3 -complete problem (Marx, 2011). Denote ¬∃Y :
φ(X,Y,Z) by φ′. The strategy here will be to combine the constructs in the previous
paragraph (propositional case) with the proof of hardness for Theorem 19. That is, introduce
a predicate xi for each xi, associated with a probabilistic fact 0.5 :: xi., and a predicate zi
for each zi, again associated with rules
zi :− not nzi. and nzi :− not zi..
And then encode each clause cj of ϕ by introducing a predicate cj(Yj), where Yj is exactly
as in the proof of Theorem 19. And as in that proof, introduce
cnf :− c1(Y1), c2(Y2), . . . , cm(Ym).
and force φ′ to be false by introducing:
clash :− not clash, cnf..
The question of whether this program has a stable model for every configuration of X then
solves the original question about satisfiability of ϕ.
Again we have left open the complexity of consistency checking for plps without a bound
on predicate arity. This question should be addressed in future work.
8 The complexity of inference under the well-founded seman-
tics
In this section we investigate the complexity of probabilistic inference under the well-founded
semantics. As before, we examine propositional and relational programs, and within the
latter we look at programs with a bound on predicate arity. Note that a bound on predicate
arity forces each predicate to have a polynomial number of groundings, but the grounding
of the program may still be exponential (as there is no bound on the number of atoms that
appear in a single rule, each rule may have many logical variables, thus leading to many
groundings).
Theorem 28. Adopt the well-founded semantics for plps. The inferential complexity of
plps is PEXP-complete; it is PPNP-complete if the plp has a bound on the arity of its
predicates; it is PP-complete if the plp is propositional. The query complexity of plps is
PP-complete.
Proof. Consider first propositional plps. Such a plp can encode any Bayesian network
over binary variables (Poole, 1993), so inference is PP-hard. Membership is proved by
adapting the arguments in the proof of Theorem 19; whenever a total choice is selected by
the nondeterministic Turing machine, logical inference (under the well-founded semantics)
is run with polynomial effort in the resulting propositional normal logic program (Dantsin
et al., 2001).
Consider now plps with logical variables. Membership follows from the same argument
in the previous paragraph, using the fact that inference in normal logic programs under the
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well-founded semantics is in EXP (Dantsin et al., 2001). Hardness follows from the fact that
inferential complexity is PEXP-hard already for acyclic programs (Theorem 20).
Now consider plps with a bound on the arity of predicates. Membership follows from
the same argument in the previous paragraphs, using the fact that inference in normal logic
programs with a bound on the arity of predicates is under the well-founded semantics is
in in PNP, as proved in Theorem 29. Hardness for PPNP follows from the fact that infer-
ence complexity of plps under the stable model semantics is PPNP-hard even for stratified
programs, and noting that for stratified programs the stable model and the well-founded
semantics agree.
The proof of Theorem 28, in the case of plps with bound on predicate arity, uses the
following result. Note that this is a result on logical inference; however it does not seem to
be found in current literature.
Theorem 29. Consider the class of normal logic programs with a bound on the arity of
predicates, and consider the problem of deciding whether a literal is in the well-founded
model of the program. This decision problem is PNP-complete.
Proof. Hardness follows from the hardness of logical inference with stratified programs
under the stable model semantics (Eiter et al., 2007). Membership requires more work.
We use the monotone operator LFTP(LFTP(I)). Consider the algorithm that constructs
the well-founded extension by starting with the empty interpretation and by iterating
LFTP(LFTP(I)). As there are only polynomially-many groundings, there are at most a
polynomial number of iterations. Thus in essence we need to iterate the operator LFTP(I);
thus, focus attention on the computation of LFTP(I). The latter computation consists of
finding the least fixpoint of TPI . So we must focus on the effort involved in computing the
least fixpoint of TPI . Again, there are at most a polynomial number of iterations of TPI to
be run. So, focus on a single iteration of TPI . Note that any interpretation I has polyno-
mial size; however, we cannot explicitly generate the reduct PI as it may have exponential
size. What we need to do then is, for each grounded atom A, to decide whether there is a
rule whose grounding makes the atom A true in TPI . So we must make a nondeterministic
choice per atom (the choice has the size of logical variables in a rule, a polynomial number).
Hence by running a polynomial number of nondeterministic choices, we obtain an iteration
of TPI ; by running a polynomial number of such iterations, we obtain a single iteration of
LFTP(I); and by running a polynomial number of such iterations, we build the well-founded
model. Thus we are within PNP as desired.
Obviously, for the well-founded semantics there are no concerns about consistency: every
normal logic program has a well-founded semantics, so every plp has one and only one well-
founded semantics.
9 Conclusion
We can summarize our contributions as follows. First, we have identified and compared the
main ideas between the credal and the well-founded semantics for plps based on probabilistic
facts and normal logic programs. Other semantics may be studied in future work, but the
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Propositional PLPb PLP Query
Acyclic PP PPNP PEXP PP
Stratified PP PPNP PEXP PP
General, credal PPNP PPNP
NP
? PPNP
General, well-founded PP PPNP PEXP PP
Table 2: Complexity results. All entries refer to completeness with respect to many-one
reductions. Columns “Propositional”, “PLPb”, and “PLP respectively refer to the inferential
complexity of propositional plps, the inferential complexity of plps with a bound on predi-
cate arity, and plps with no bound on predicate arity. Column “Query” refers to the query
complexity of relational plps.
credal and the well-founded ones seem to be the most important starting point. Second, we
have shown that the credal semantis is intimately related to infinitely monotone Choquet
capacitites; precisely: the credal semantics of a consistent plp is a credal set that dominates
a infinitely monotone Choquet capacity. Third, we have derived the inferential and query
complexity of acyclic, stratified and general plps both under the credal and the well-founded
semantics. These results on complexity are summarized in Table 2; note that plps reach
non-trivial classes in the counting hierarchy. It is interesting to note that acyclic plps with
a bound on arity go beyond Bayesian networks in the complexity classes they can reach.
Concerning complexity, acyclic and stratified plps have identical credal and well-founded
semantics, while general plps may have different credal and well-founded semantics. For
normal logic programs (not probabilistic ones), the well-founded semantics is known to
stay within lower complexity classes than the credal semantics (Dantsin et al., 2001); the
same phenomenon persists in the probabilistic case. Indeed, the well-founded semantics for
general plps reaches the same complexity classes as for acyclic plps. One might take this
as an argument for the well-founded semantics, on top of the fact that the well-founded
semantics is defined for any plp. On the other hand, our analysis in Section 4 favors, at
least conceptually, the credal semantics, despite the fact that it may not be defined for some
plps (in fact one might argue that no semantics should be defined for such plps). It is much
easier to understand the meaning of plps using the credal semantics than the well-founded
semantics, as the latter mixes three-valued logic and probabilities in a non-trivial way. We
suggest that more study is needed to isolate those programs where undefined values are
justified and can be properly mixed with probabilities. Also, the well-founded semantics
may be taken as an approximation of the set of possible probability models. In any case,
we find that Lukasiewicz’s credal semantics is quite attractive and not as well known as it
deserves to be.
We could include in the analysis of plps a number of useful constructs that have been
adopted in answer set programming (Eiter et al., 2009). There, classic negation, such as
¬wins(X), is allowed on top of not. Also, constraints, such as :− φ, are allowed to mean
that φ is false. More substantial is the presence, in answer set programming, of disjunctive
heads. With such a machinery, we can for instance rewrite the rules in Example 9 as a single
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rule single(X) ∨ husband(X) :− man(X)., and the rules in Example 11 as the pair:
color(V, red) ∨ color(V, yellow) ∨ color(V, green) :− vertex(V ).
:− edge(V,U), color(V,C), color(U,C).
Now the point to be made is this. Suppose we have a probabilistic logic program
〈P,PF〉, where as before we have independent probabilistic facts, but where P is now a
logic program with classic negation, constraints, disjuctive heads, and P is consistent in
that it has stable models for every total choice of probabilistic facts. The proof of Theorem
14 can be reproduced in this setting, and hence the credal semantics (the set of measures
over stable models) of these probabilistic answer set programs is again an infinite monotone
credal set. The complexity of inference with these constructs is left for future investigation.
Much more is yet to be explored concerning the complexity of plps. Several classes of
plps deserve attention, such as definite, tight, strict, order-consistent programs, and pro-
grams with aggregates and other constructs. The inclusion of functions (with appropriate
restrictions to ensure decidability) is another challenge. Concerning complexity theory it-
self, it seems that approximability should be investigated, as well as questions surrounding
learnability and expressivity of plps.
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